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The Institutional Configuration of Deweyan 
Democracy 
 




After more than two decades of effort to recover and adapt John 
Dewey’s thought for a reformed liberal politics, the institutional 
implications of his ideas remain elusive. This essay argues that a 
distinctive set of modern business practices and an incipient public 
policy architecture embody key precepts of Dewey’s political theory. 
The practices and architecture have developed independently of 
Dewey’s ideas, but they elaborate the ideas implicitly, and they are 





For much of the past century, Americans of all political persuasions have been 
happy to call themselves pragmatists. Yet the pre-eminent pragmatist philo-
sopher in the realm of political thought – John Dewey – considered pragmatism 
inimical to what have remained the two dominant political ideologies in 
America – free-market conservatism and welfare-state liberalism. Dewey’s 
voluminous writings and tireless political activism did little to curb the promi-
scuous waving of the pragmatist banner. He showed important connections 
between the core ideas of pragmatism and the concerns of political theory, but 
his arguments remained vague about policies and institutions.  
After several decades of neglect, Dewey re-emerged as a major focus of 
attention among liberals in the 1990s. His rejection of both the bureaucratic 
welfare state and the rights-deducing judiciary seemed to have been vindicated 
by the difficulties of many liberal programs of the preceding years. His critique 
of both technocratic efficiency maximization and constitutional reasoning from 
first principles in favor of participatory democracy and deliberative consensus 
suggested to some a promising re-orientation of liberal thought. Yet, even after 
an outpouring of admiring re-examinations of Dewey’s liberalism, the institu-
tional implications of his work seem elusive.1 
In fact, Dewey’s version of pragmatism does have distinctive implica-
tions for government, but until recently these implications have been difficult to 
explain because there were few operating institutions that embodied them. This 




is no longer the case. Institutions have developed in a variety of spheres that 
seem to exemplify concretely the key aims and insights of Dewey’s vision. 
Some of the clearest and most developed examples have originated in business 
practice and then been applied in the public sphere. These practical develop-
ments have occurred independently of the revival of pragmatist political 
thought, but they complement it. Putting the revived theory together with the 
innovative practices gives plausibility to the theory and helps explain what’s 
politically significant about the practices. 
In section 2, I rehearse some prominent general themes of Dewey’s work 
and then suggest that they raise three key issues about Pragmatist-inspired 
political institutions: First, how can social norms be open to continuous re-
assessment and yet provide the stability needed for social order? Second, how 
do we empower diverse local groups while maintaining the ability to coordinate 
activity across a large nation? Third, how do we organize deliberative engage-
ment to produce effective collaboration among people with diverse interests?  
In section 3, I argue that late 20th century organizational innovations 
suggest responses to these issues. I point in particular to three features of con-
temporary business organization – lean production manufacturing, standardized 
work and performance assessment, and team-based decision-making. The 
institutional forms associated with these practices have become increasingly 
salient in recent public policy development. They can be seen in many areas of 
regulation, social welfare, and civil rights. The central common feature of 
private and public organizational innovation is a focus on continuous learning 
and adaptation. In the private sphere, this focus entails rejection of the 
traditional distinction between conception of tasks and their execution. In the 
public sphere, it entails rejection of the traditional distinction between enactment 
of laws or policies and their implementation. 
Outside the business sector, there is no standard vocabulary for these 
reforms. Public-sphere practitioners sometimes use the terms “management-
based” regulation and “evidence-based” social service practice to refer to them. 
Academics have applied the names “responsive regulation” or “new 
governance.” Deweyan rhetoric is less common, but a few have suggested that 
the term “Democratic Experimentalism” better expresses the deepest aspirations 
and greatest potential of the developments.2 
 
2. Pragmatism and Democracy 
 
Dewey built his idea of democracy on the key starting points of Pragmatism – 
instrumentalism and contextualism. The instrumentalist point was that our 
beliefs are, as William James put it, “rules for action.”3 In deciding whether to 
maintain them, we should focus on the kinds of action that follow from them. 
More provocatively, James suggested that “truth” was simply a name for a belief 
that had good consequences. The measure of truth is, not the extent to which a 
belief corresponds to some ultimate reality, but rather the extent to which the 




belief does valuable work for the believer. Of course, the consequences James 
had in mind were not simply material ones, but also cognitive and emotional 
ones. We have an interest in making sense of our experience, and a belief that 
helps us do that has good consequences. We have an interest in giving meaning 
to our lives, and a belief that helps us do that also has good consequences. 
So the consequential test does not turn us into materialists or relativists. It 
does, however, discourage us from worrying about some issues. Does a tree fall 
in the woods if no one is there to see it? Today this question is a joke used to 
characterize a kind of academic cluelessness. When we treat it as joke, we are 
taking for granted the consequential test. Some questions once hotly debated 
among philosophers seem pointless when we realize that they are unlikely to 
have answers that would help us enjoy, understand, or control the world.4 
After the instrumental principle, the next distinctive tenet of Pragmatism 
is that knowledge is experiential. This term connoted something more contextual 
and/or more active than the vision of knowledge in the philosophers that 
preceded him. Some philosophers had emphasized the role of innate universal 
mental processes in enabling people to make sense of the world. Still others had 
portrayed knowledge as the accumulation of more or less discrete sensations or 
impressions from experience in the world. The Pragmatists emphasized that 
people use rules to interpret their experience, but they thought that to an 
important extent these rules were invented socially and individually. Individuals 
absorbed a stock of interpretive rules with membership in society; they 
formulated others out of their own experience; and they revised all such rules in 
the light of further experience.  
Pragmatists have been especially interested in the confrontation between 
the inherited stock of rules and new dissonant experience that doesn’t square 
with them. A stargazer notes a movement of planets that doesn’t correspond to 
the accepted laws of planetary motion. A soldier who has never questioned his 
duty of obedience to superior officers finds that following a particular order 
would require him to inflict harm on civilians that he senses would be 
unjustifiable. Or to take a more mundane but pervasive example: Someone who 
has always liked a particular kind of food, say pork chops, is served a dish of 
this kind that she dislikes. Situations such as these produced what the 
Pragmatists sometimes called an “irritation,”5 a sense of unease that led to a 
desire to reconcile rule and experience. In order to do so, a person would be 
inclined to reconsider and perhaps revise her rule. Knowledge is a perpetual 
learning process involving a series of such encounters. Modern science works 
self-consciously in this manner. The pragmatists thought that everyday life 
worked this way unconsciously. 
This picture of endless confrontation between rule and experience has 
characteristics that have often been attributed to American culture in general. On 
the one hand, it connotes a restless striving. Pragmatism denies us the comforts 
promised by some perspectives that a set of beliefs describes definitively an 
ultimate reality and thus settles some questions once and for all. Our theories, 




James said, “are instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We 
don’t lie back on them, we move forward....”6 On the other hand, the ceaseless 
revision Pragmatism exhorts is incremental, not revolutionary. Unlike Rousseau 
or Marx, the Pragmatists do not see progress as depending on the abrupt 
uprooting and replacement of whole systems of thought and practice.  
James described Pragmatism as “primarily a method for settling 
metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.”7 Dewey, however, 
envisioned a broader role. To James’s principles of instrumentalism and 
contextualism, Dewey added a distinctive conception of sociability. People are 
creatures of social context; their wants, beliefs, dispositions are influenced by 
their surroundings. Yet, at the same time, they have the capacity to alter their 
surroundings in accordance with their desires. And a person’s well-being, in 
both emotional and material senses, is a function of social interaction. Thus, 
collaboration comes naturally, and at its best, it takes the form of problem-
solving – efforts prompted by commonly felt “irritations” to adjust surroundings 
in some beneficial way.8 
Dewey criticized libertarian and laissez-faire theories for exalting the 
satisfactions of isolation and individual independence and neglecting the social 
dimension of personality. The most plausible individualism, he insisted – the 
kind that exalts and facilitates the greatest development of each person’s 
capacities and interests – can only flourish in relations of social collaboration. 
He saw American politics as failing to engage the solidaristic impulses of 
American citizens. He diagnosed the problem as both cultural and institutional. 
American public culture was preoccupied with individual satisfactions and 
autonomy and failed to provide any sense of common purpose or value. And 
political institutions failed to provide meaningful opportunities for participation 
in political decision-making. Dewey considered that latter failing more 
fundamental. He rejected the ideas of critics who thought that a moral 
reformation away from individualism toward a communitarian ethic was the 
place to begin. In response, he insisted that cultural change without institutional 
change would be ineffective. And he suggested that if institutional change 
induced effective public participation, a strengthened sense of solidarity and 
shared values would follow spontaneously.  
Dewey’s was not a family conception of sociability, attributing solidarity 
to shared background and culture, but a lifeboat conception that associates 
solidarity with the possibility and experience of beneficial collaboration. In a 
lifeboat, people collaborate because their welfare depends on it. Diverse values 
and perspectives are rarely disabling obstacles, and they are often beneficial by 
giving the group access to a broader range of relevant knowledge. 
Dewey was sympathetic to many arguments for democracy, but he made 
one that was distinctively grounded in his Pragmatism.9 Democracy, he argued, 
was the politics best suited to effective problem-solving. This was so for at least 
two reasons. First, democracy was least tolerant of the kind of ossification of 
belief that he saw as the most basic problem of social order. At the core of 




Dewey’s social vision is a radical interpretation of the Pragmatist idea of 
thinking as the continual collision of acquired belief and new experience. Dewey 
taught that we depend on habit – actions based on acquired belief – because we 
cannot rethink every issue every time we make a decision. Yet, habit becomes a 
disability when it congeals into what he called “routine” – a mental rigidity that 
numbs the actor to new experience. Social practices and institutions are 
stabilized by inertia, but the circumstances to which they initially responded 
inevitably change. The inertia of routine causes practices and institutions to lag 
behind. The mental rigidity that inhibits adaptation to new experience, which 
James had portrayed as a psychological malady of individuals, was for Dewey 
the most central social and political problem. A key part of Dewey’s case for 
democracy was that it made public convention vulnerable to re-examination and 
challenge.10 The second reason why Dewey considered democracy a better mode 
of social problem solving was its capacity to elicit and take account of a broader 
range of evidence and views than other forms of government. Democracy 
maximizes participation in public matters, bringing to bear the greatest range of 
perspectives. The group can consider more alternatives in formulating its goals 
and more information in choosing ways of attaining them.11 
During his time at the University of Chicago from 1894 to 1904, he 
founded and helped run the “laboratory school” which became a famous model 
for a distinctive form of pedagogy that remains his most developed example of 
Pragmatist practice. Dewey’s laboratory school and its successors disfavor the 
kind of educational experience in which teachers present information to a class 
assembled as a whole, and students either listen and take notes or respond 
individually to questions put to them by the teacher. In its most characteristic 
moments, the Deweyan classroom divided students into small groups and gave 
them tasks calling for collaboration and creativity.  
The groups designed and built pencil boxes for their own use, or they 
prepared meals for the class. When studying colonial history, they might plant 
crops or design a colonial town. Or they might act out a town meeting or a trial. 
When studying Indian tribes, one group might study and design shelter of the 
sort used by the tribe, while others might plan a hunt. The teachers framed the 
tasks and provided information about how to proceed. But learning came most 
importantly from the experience of devising and trying out different responses. 
Abstract learning built on such experiences. Thus, many practical building tasks 
involving measurement and calculation introduced mathematical skills and 
concepts that were later elaborated more formally. Artistic education was 
conceived in a similar fashion. The students’ general capacities for imaginative 
identification and elaboration were developed as they performed or created or 
responded to artistic works in groups. 
In the Deweyan classroom, the student learns to understand abstract 
learning as “helps and adjuncts in relation to more direct modes of 
experience.”12 This follows from the principle of contextualism. The pragmatist 
teacher takes the abstract systematized knowledge of mathematics, history, 




literature and other fields and “reinstate[s] [it] into experience”13 by presenting it 
in the form of practical challenges. Yet, at the same time, students are taught to 
move beyond immediate experience by subjecting it to speculative and 
analytical generalization. This effort follows from the instrumental principle. 
The student distances herself from her context when she considers how her 
understanding of it might illuminate other contexts. The capacity to generalize is 
a defense against the pressures of unreflective convention. “Ability to frame 
hypotheses is the means by which man is liberated from the existences that… 
play on him physically and sensibly,” Dewey wrote.14 In addition, this pedagogy 
built on Dewey’s notion of sociability. He expected that students would find 
collaboration intrinsically satisfying and that collaboration would encourage 
more than restrict individual development. 
Dewey interpreted the success of Pragmatist pedagogy in the Laboratory 
School as support for the possibility of a broadened role for collaboration in the 
political realm. Another key theme that Dewey extrapolated from the education-
al to the political realm was experimental inquiry. Properly structured, politics, 
like education, was a form of problem-solving. Again, political institutions 
failed to facilitate this type of politics in a democratic fashion. Dewey especially 
emphasized the problem of access to information. Citizens had trouble making 
use of their political opportunities because they lacked information needed to 
assess both problems and solutions. Information was monopolized by elites and 
made public in forms designed to advance their own interests, rather than public 
interests. Political reform depended on the democratization of information, 
which means, not just more access to information, but to information in a form 
that enables public identification of problems and assessment of solutions. “An 
inchoate public is capable of organization only when indirect consequences are 
perceived, and when it is possible to project agencies which order their 
occurrence.”15 Democratic participation requires new “instruments, appliances 
and apparatuses designed for the purposes of disclosing relations not otherwise 
apparent” and “a much greater range of variations” in policy responses.16 
The closest Dewey had to a large-scale model for political organization 
was science. He repeatedly suggested that politics should emulate key features 
of the institutions of science – the commitment to testing belief against 
experience, freedom to criticize established views, transparency and free access 
to information, and a sense of collaboration among peers. In science, as Dewey 
envisioned it, anyone is free to challenge accepted beliefs. People respond to 
such challenges, not by attempting to resolve them abstractly, but by agreeing on 
procedures for testing the relative merits of competing propositions. A test 
typically involves controlled variation – the setting up of different but compara-
ble circumstances in which the effect of different interventions on a common 
material or a common intervention on different materials can be compared. We 
measure the results in terms of agreed criteria. And then we assess the 
significance of the results for the challenged belief. The resulting conclusion is 
not established by bureaucratic fiat or by majority vote, but by an informal 




consensus among members of a loosely defined community of practitioners.  
The idea of science as a model for government seems radical because it 
denies the distinction between facts about the way the world is and values that 
suggest what it should be. There’s a tendency (still strong though less so than in 
Dewey’s day) to think of science as about fact and government as about value. 
Many and perhaps all social and political issues are value-laden. Methods 
designed to discover the structure of the physical world do not seem well 
designed to resolve competing notions of value. Technocrats respond to this 
objection by insisting that government is not really about values. They assume 
that to a large extent people want or need more or less the same thing, so that 
government is largely about technical questions of how to implement these 
desires and beliefs. This, however, was not Dewey’s idea. Dewey’s admiration 
for science did not lead him to contemplate putting scientists in charge of 
society as a technocratic elite, but to suggest that scientific norms and practices 
be diffused as the democratic practice of ordinary citizens.  
Against the technocrats, Dewey insisted that political questions were 
value-laden. Yet he further denied that there was any strong separation between 
facts (the province of science) and values (the province of government). If 
political questions were value-laden, they were also fact-laden in a way that 
made them susceptible to the kind of expanded, popularized scientific inquiry he 
envisioned.17 Political questions are fact-laden in at least two senses. In the first 
place, many commitments people think of as values depend on empirical 
assumptions. People’s views on abortion often depend on assumptions on such 
matters as the nature of the fetus at various stages in the course of pregnancy or 
what child-bearing will mean to the mother. People’s views on the death penalty 
often depend on assumptions on such matters as whether we can reliably 
distinguish guilty from innocent defendants in capital cases or whether the 
penalty deters crime. These issues are susceptible to investigation in accordance 
with traditional scientific methods. 
Dewey also had a more radical notion about the extent to which political 
controversy lent itself to scientific inquiry. People’s desires and commitments 
about values are in important senses, not just reports of their own interior states 
at the moment, but beliefs about the world – beliefs about what will make them 
or their fellows happy or virtuous or fulfilled. People revise these beliefs in the 
light of their own experience and what they learn of the experience of others. 
Moreover, these beliefs can benefit from imaginative or empathic elaboration in 
conversation with others. Thus, Dewey assimilated political conflict – the 
competing assertion of goals or values – to the “irritation” of new experience in 
tension with inherited knowledge that the Pragmatists saw as the basic fuel of 
progress in understanding. For Dewey, conflict is a learning opportunity. A 
person who encounters another pursuing competing public goals has a reason to 
re-assess her own and an opportunity to deepen her understanding through 
engagement with the other. It was the job of democratic institutions to facilitate 
this engagement in peaceful and productive ways.  




The most appropriate test of Dewey’s ideas would be a practical one. 
How do Deweyan institutions work in practice? The problem is that Dewey’s 
ideas usually peter out at the point of specific design. Nevertheless, among 
Dewey’s general themes, we find three important clues about institutional 
design. Deweyan democracy is provisional, local, and deliberative. 
Norms are provisional in a Deweyan democracy because government is a 
learning process. “[P]olicies and proposals for social action [should] be treated 
as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed. 
They will be experimental in the sense that they will be entertained subject to 
constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they entail when 
acted upon, and subject to read and flexible revision in the light of observed 
consequences.”18 Provisionality implies a forward-looking perspective that is in 
tension with traditional legal culture. Legal culture tends to see the legitimacy of 
public action in terms of its “pedigree” – its connection to previously enacted or 
announced authority. Dewey was not contemptuous of authority. On an instru-
mentalist view, deference to authority serves various social purposes. It gives 
weight to the views of institutions that are relatively likely to have insight into or 
responsibility for the matter. It facilitates planning and coordination by enabling 
citizens to anticipate how officials will act. However, these values are not, for 
Dewey, as they are for traditional lawyers, fundamental and categorical. They 
merely represent consequences to be weighed against the consequences of 
revising or departing from established norms.19 A Deweyan cannot deny that in 
theory there could be too much re-examination. Stability is a value. Without 
settled dispositions – habits – individuals would be schizophrenic and society 
would be anarchic. But the Deweyan perspective fears the centripetal social 
forces more than the centrifugal ones. 
Second, Deweyan democracy is also fundamentally local. “The local is 
the ultimate universal, as near an absolute as exists,” he wrote.20 The “final 
actuality” – the key sort of problem-solving resolution – “is accomplished in 
face-to-face relationships by means of direct give-and-take.”21 In such 
interaction, motivation to share effort and information is strongest. The larger 
society “will do its final work in ordering the relations and enriching the 
experience of local associations.”22 The emphasis on proximity also follows 
from the definition of issues. Groups are problem-focused and problems tend to 
be local in the sense that their effects and probable solutions vary by context. 
One of Dewey’s complaints about electoral politics was that it is too organized 
around abstract propositions. Such propositions are less likely to engage the 
interests and knowledge of citizens than problems they perceive as close to 
home. Moreover, general abstract propositions are likely to be framed in terms 
of ideologies, and ideologies are needlessly divisive because they are subject to 
the same tendency to congealment as institutions. Theories crafted in response to 
a practical situation persist unchanged long after the circumstances that inspired 
them have disappeared. Large corporations served the interests of a small elite. 
They created an internal culture of regimentation and conformity among their 




employees, and fostered an external consumer culture of materialism. Along 
with other leftists of the day, Dewey emphasized the irony that an ideology of 
laissez-faire individualism had produced a society of large institutions that 
stifled individual expression and development. 
Dewey saw the liberalism of the day as infected by the same over-
centralization as the corporate economy. He criticized the New Deal for its 
reliance on top-down bureaucratic organization and the dominance by elite 
experts. He predicted they would do little to mitigate the dispiriting alienation of 
ordinary citizens from public life. And he was skeptical about the problem-
solving capacity of technocracy. Expert-run bureaucracy would lack access to 
the kind of dispersed street-level information that was key to effective policy 
formulation. “The man who wears the shoe knows best where it pinches, even if 
the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied.”23 
Yet, Dewey also thought that American government was in some respects 
under-centralized. The effectiveness of the local problem-solving efforts he 
considered fundamental depended on the support of more encompassing 
institutions that had yet to develop. “We have inherited ... local town meeting 
practices and ideas. But we live and have our being in a continental nation 
state,” he lamented.24 For him, the most important deficiencies of traditional 
decentralization were not the limited capacity to deal with spillovers (like 
pollution) or public goods (like defense) that contemporary theorists emphasize. 
Rather they concerned the process of mutual learning or “emulation.”25 The role 
he most emphasized for central government was in organizing knowledge and 
protecting the conditions of inquiry. 
Third, Deweyan government is deliberative because deliberation 
enhances the chances for the participants to learn from each other, and because 
deliberative agreement is the most basic test of the legitimacy of public action. 
Sound resolution requires the informed agreement of stakeholders.26 In 
deliberation, people advance their positions through reasons, and they have a 
duty to reconsider their claims in the light of the reasons advanced by others. 
Thus, not only do people have an opportunity to learn from their peers about 
different ways of attaining their goals, but they have an opportunity to consider 
and reconsider what their goals are.  
Deliberation tends to favor consensus over majority rule but not 
dogmatically. Literal consensus is often impossible either because views never 
converge or because “hold outs” behave opportunistically. But simple majority 
rule is objectionable where it obviates the need of an initial majority to listen 
seriously to and try to persuade minority. As Dewey said, quoting Samuel 
Tilden, “The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the more 
important thing.” “Counting heads” is most important, not because it weighs 
preferences, but because it “compels prior recourse to methods of discussion, 
consultation, and persuasion.”27 
These general characteristics – provisional, local and deliberative – 
hardly add up to a concrete or coherent institutional vision. Indeed, in some 




respects, they exacerbate the ambiguity. Three questions remain salient. First, 
what does a structure of laws or norms look like that isn’t prone to congeal? 
How can precepts be open to continuous re-assessment and yet provide the 
stability needed for effective social order? Second, how do we empower diverse 
local groups while maintaining the ability to coordinate activity across a large 
nation? What kind of institutions can coordinate local communities without 
excessively centralizing and homogenizing? Third, there are a set of questions 
about the construction of “face-to-face” problem-solving deliberations. How do 
we achieve effective participation without excluding people who want to 
participate or conscripting people who don’t want to? How do we avoid the 
problems of unreflective intransigence (e.g., group polarization) on the one hand 
and unreflective conformity (e.g., herd behavior) on the other? When agreement 
is reached, how can we be sure that it reflects convergent, reflective views, 
rather than background social pressures? 
Dewey’s failure to answer these questions has left the field to those who 
recognized the same problems as he but thought that the market was the only 
non-Utopian answer. Notably, Friedrich Hayek defended the market as 
responsive to more or less these three questions.28 Hayek shared Dewey’s belief 
in learning as the key engine of social progress, and in the need to subject settled 
practices to destabilizing challenges. Like Dewey, he disdained bureaucracy. 
But unlike Dewey he was skeptical about the possibility or desirability of 
collectively regulating the aggregate consequences of individual interaction. 
And again in contrast to Dewey, he disdained reliance on social solidarity and 
saw little promise in face-to-face citizen engagement. For Hayek, the impersonal 
operation of the market played the key role in social learning and development. 
Markets generate productive destabilization within constraints. The ability of 
entrepreneurs to offer new products or better prices subjects producers to 
continual pressure to improve. The market fosters both diversity and coordina-
tion through the price mechanism. Prices coordinate by directing resources 
toward their most productive uses, but since the price system demands of 
economic activity only that it pay its costs, it leaves economic actors free to 
produce an infinite array of products in response to the preferences of 
consumers. The price system does not, of course, induce public deliberation, but 
in the Hayekian vision, it virtually eliminates the need for it. 
Dewey rejected this answer. While he respected the capitalist market as 
an engine of innovation for private goods, he complained that its destabilizing 
tendencies were too reckless in some respects and too timid in others (for 
example, in its respect for concentrated property). Moreover, he thought that 
even within the range of choices the market permits people to make, people 
don’t know enough to choose intelligently and that the market doesn’t help them 
learn. He thought that innovation would require institutions modeled on science 
– those that facilitated cooperative investigation and sharing of information – as 
well as those fostering competition.  
 




Dewey and Hayek are probably the thinkers who have most influenced 
American social thought in recent years. Yet Hayek’s influence on public policy 
appears to have been greater than Dewey’s in part because Hayek’s followers 
have had an easier time deriving specific cues for practical reform from his 
work. 
 
3. Institutional Design 
 
What would Deweyan institutions look like? While Dewey’s views have salient 
affinity with some prominent contemporary political perspectives, these 
perspectives tend not to incorporate the full range of Deweyan commitments. 
There have been many recent defenses of deliberative democracy, but 
they tend to prescribe deliberation primarily for broad sectors of civil society or 
for generalist electoral and legislative processes.29 By contrast, for Dewey, both 
the efficacy and the legitimacy of political participation correlate with interest. 
Deweyan deliberation is most characteristically stakeholder deliberation. 
Moreover, proposals for deliberative democracy often assume or in some cases 
(notably Jürgen Habermas’s30) posit explicitly that the decisions of generalist 
political institutions be implemented in a conventionally bureaucratic fashion. In 
the Deweyan view, however, deliberation spills over into implementation. 
 Another recent perspective, particularly salient in the “alternative dispute 
resolution” literature, promotes deliberative problem-solving by people recruited 
because of their interest in the matter or by local communities where nearly all 
members are likely to be interested.31 But in much of this work, the core values 
are harmony and stability. Deliberation is an ad hoc response to disruption, and 
its key purpose is to re-establish equilibrium. Dewey’s emphasis on the dangers 
that consensus will ossify and on the need for institutionalized diversity as a 
spur to re-assessment and discovery are absent. Moreover, some of this work 
adopts the Deweyan theme of decentralization without paying heed to Dewey’s 
sense of the inadequacy of “New England town meeting” style organization to 
the conditions of modernity. 
The ideas and practices that most resonate with Dewey’s political views 
combine local deliberative problem-solving by stakeholders with encompassing 
institutions that pool the knowledge gained from these deliberations in ways that 
support and discipline them. There have recently been some general accounts of 
such a framework.32 I focus here on three sets of practices that promise to play 
an important role in their elaboration. In each case, the practices first became 
salient in business organization and have more recently influenced practice in 
the public sphere, for example, in the form of “management-based” regulation 
and “evidence-based” social service practice. Although they have been 
developed for the most part without reference to Dewey, they seem to align 
quite closely with his concerns. 
The practices are responsive to the three questions posed above about 
Deweyan institutionalization. Lean production illustrates how a system can 




combine routine destabilization of settled practices with productive order. 
Standardization illustrates the potential to foster diversity without sacrificing the 
ability to coordinate. And team-based decision-making shows how the benefits 
of deliberation can be obtained without definite solutions to fundamental issues 
about participation and decision making. 
Each of these practices is potentially useful in elaborating Dewey’s 
repeated claim that democracy depends on “a kind of knowledge and insight that 
does not yet exist.”33 This knowledge involves “conceptions which are used as 
tools of inquiry and which are tested, rectified, and caused to grow in use.”34 
Each practice facilitates a type of learning that is potentially democratically 
empowering. 
 
3.1. Lean Production – Implementation as a Learning Process 
 
A distinctive approach to manufacturing emerged in the decades following 
World War II. The approach is associated with terms such as “lean production” 
and “total quality management.” Because Toyota, the Japanese car maker, has 
pioneered in its development, it is also known as the Toyota Production System 
(TPS). TPS, as described in a vast engineering literature, may be the most 
developed example of Dewey’s idea of a social order that continuously re-
assesses and reforms by destabilizing itself.35 TPS involves a variety of ideas 
and processes, but the most critical one for our purposes can be summarized in 
terms of the Deweyan maxim: Problems are learning opportunities. In 
manufacturing, a problem is an occasion when following the usual procedure 
will not produce the intended effect. A car entering the paint station of an 
assembly plant has dirt on a fender; if painted over, it will be unsightly. Or a part 
to be inserted in the engine does not fit properly.  
Pre-Toyota, there were two traditional responses to problems in mass 
manufacturing processes, both designed to minimize disruption. Problems could 
be ignored by workers in the main production lines and saved for specialized re-
work departments. Thus, the line worker could paint over the dirt and leave the 
unsightly fender for inspectors to identify at the end of the line and send to a 
remedial department to sand, clean, and repaint. Alternatively, the line workers 
might be permitted to make quick ad hoc adjustments that would mitigate the 
effects of the problem without impeding production flow. For example, workers 
might be given a stock of “buffer” inventory – extra spare parts to use in case 
one turns out to be defective. When the worker finds a defective part, she puts it 
aside and reaches into her buffer stock. End-of-the-pipe correction and ad hoc 
adjustment allow the system to proceed according to rule. At some point, a 
centralized engineering department will learn of the problem, work out a revi-
sion of basic procedures, and write new rules. Until then, it’s business as usual. 
From a Toyota perspective, these approaches are wasteful and slow. It 
takes too long for information about problems to accumulate at the top of the 
management ladder, and too long for the elite corps of engineers to re-write the 




rules and transmit them to the workers. In the meantime, waste accumulates. 
Wasted parts continue to arrive with defects because the flaw that produces the 
defects goes uncorrected; labor is wasted in re-working things that did not get 
put together correctly the first time.  
The innovation of Toyota approach is to treat every problem as an 
occasion for re-assessing and reforming the system. In a classic Toyota-style 
plant, there are no re-work departments, and workers are told not to make ad hoc 
adjustments in response to the problems. Instead, workers should stop the 
production process and trigger a group effort to diagnose and remedy the 
problem. When the dirty fender or the defective part appears, the worker pulls 
the “andon” (lantern) cord that hangs from an overhead fixture. The line stops 
and a light display shows everyone in the plant where the problem is. A team of 
workers and supervisors who are likely to have relevant knowledge is quickly 
assembled, diagnoses the problem, and formulates a remedy. The rules get re-
written immediately. Problems are learning opportunities because they signal 
that the system is not as well designed as it could be. Waiting to let some 
specialized department figure out and remedy the problem means delay and 
risks loss of information. It also means that rank-and-file workers will not have 
the learning experience of participating in the solutions. A learning opportunity 
is at least potentially a good thing. Thus, the Toyota system is designed in some 
respects to increase and enlarge problems. One way the system increases pro-
blems is through just-in-time parts and materials practices. Parts are delivered in 
small batches as needed for short periods. This means no buffer inventories. If a 
part is defective, there is no alternative but to wait for a new one, and there’s an 
opportunity to fix the problem before more defects accumulate. 
One way the system enlarges problems is through “root-cause analysis.” 
Problem-solving does not rest content with superficial fixes but looks back 
through the system for opportunities for improvement. The rule-of-thumb is to 
go back five stages. Hence the “5 Whys.” For example: 
 
Why is machine A broken? Because no preventive maintenance was 
performed. 
Why was the maintenance crew derelict? Because it is always repairing 
machine B. 
Why is machine B always broken? Because the part it machines always 
jams. 
Why does the jam recur? Because the part is warped by heat stress. 
Why does the part overheat? A design flaw. 
 
The system thus embodies the Deweyan ideal of allowing, even 
encouraging, participants to question its norms and premises in an organized 
fashion. Of course, as long as the questioning is limited to means for producing 
a given product, it is limited by the specifications of the product. But the Toyota 
process of continuous production improvement lends itself to processes of 




continuous product redesign. As the firm receives information from customers, 
competitors, and its own engineers that suggest ways to improve its products, it 
can introduce product improvements quickly in the same way in which it makes 
improvements to the production process. Design engineers sometimes work in 
teams with rank-and-file workers so that small design improvements can be 
quickly added. More ambitious changes require more preparation, but they can 
be more quickly assimilated by a workforce skilled in the practices of 
continuous reform. 
To get an idea of how Toyota-style production practices might be 
relevant to democracy, consider that fundamental features of our traditional 
government structures resemble pre-Toyota manufacturing. We have hier-
archical rule-bound bureaucracies that engage in routine production of, say, 
education, workplace safety, or crime control. When routine leads to counter-
productive conduct, we deal with problems either by giving officials ad hoc 
discretion to deviate from the rules or by allowing aggrieved citizens to go to a 
parallel system of error-correction and re-work – courts. The courts intervene to 
correct particular errors in cases that are presented to them, but their 
interventions do not necessarily reveal or remedy the underlying causes of the 
errors in the process of routine administration. As with traditional industrial 
production, complaints about loss of information and sluggish response to 
problems are frequent in the public sphere. These complaints have prompted 
public-sector reforms that have some resemblance to TPS.  
For example, consider the recent proliferation in health and safety 
regulation of reporting and analysis requirements with respect to harmless 
mistakes. In industries like airlines or nuclear power, where accidents are rare 
but enormously costly when they happen, there is a long-standing practice of 
reporting and analyzing “near misses” – performance failures that do not cause 
injury but are symptoms of problems that could. The requirements typically 
include a “trace-back” or “root cause analysis” that constructs a causal chain 
back into the system potentially to stages remote from the immediate cause. 
Analogous procedures have recently been extended to areas such as hospital 
medicine and food safety. These regimes typically treat discrete violations of an 
exacting standard as an occasion for a diagnostic inquiry into the possibility of 
potentially remediable systemic defects.36 
Below is a page from a sample food safety plan under a regime known as 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HAACP) widely used in the 
European Union, and more recently, the U.S. In HAACP-type regulation, the 
regulator declares general goals but requires the regulated actors to formulate 
their own plans for achieving the goals. The regulator then assesses the 
adequacy of the plans and audits the actors’ compliance with their own plans. 
Note how the plan mandates that non-compliance be treated diagnostically. 
When specified standards are not met, the firm has to engage in 
“corrective/preventive action,” which means not just an immediate fix but an 
evaluation of the “cause of deficiency,” as well as a “verification process,” 










U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Pathogen Reduction: Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems – Final Rule,” Federal Register (July 
28, 1996), at 38902.  
 




Toyota analogues in the social services area can be found in monitoring 
systems in programs for mental health patients, developmentally disabled 
people, and abused and neglected children. An especially sophisticated example 
is the “Service Testing” model developed by the Child Welfare Policy Group in 
Alabama, which is being used in the child protective services of twelve states. 
The model involves intensive reviews of individual cases by teams of inside and 
outside reviewers, with the participation of the case worker, and with interviews 
of the clients and service providers. The review is intended in part as a form of 
training for the workers and often the reviewers. (Often the team will include an 
experienced and a new reviewer. The workers themselves may become review-
ers of other workers cases.) The review involves detailed qualitative discussion 
of all aspects of the case that the participants consider relevant. It also generates 
numerical scores of the system’s performance and the child’s well-being and 
progress. The scores are aggregated to generate diagnostic indicators of 
performance of different, regions, offices and workers, or of the system as a 
whole with respect to different types of cases or problems. “The fundamental 
assumption of the Service Testing model,” according to the Group’s literature, 
“is that each case is a unique and valid test of the system.”37 
Processes of this kind exemplify the kind of structured destabilization 
Dewey seemed to call for. They inhibit the ossification of established practices 
by inducing continuous re-examination through a combination of exacting 
standards that generate problems/learning opportunities and by a diagnostic 
approach that treats problems in systemic terms. Yet the reconstruction they 
encourage is incremental. Root cause analysis limits examination to the portions 
of the system that seem implicated in particular problems. Change occurs 
constantly, and it is thoroughgoing, but only as a consequence of a series of 
discrete steps taken as experience reveals opportunities.  
 
3.2. Standardization: Diversity-increasing Coordination 
 
Dewey often associated “standardization and uniformity” with the stultification 
of bureaucracy, but more than once he suggested that the connection is not an 
inevitable one. In The Public and Its Problems, he wrote “Uniformity and 
standardization may provide an underlying basis for differentiation and 
liberation of individual potentialities.”38 He did not elaborate this idea there, but 
we get some idea of his meaning from his discussion of abstraction in science. 
Standardized measurement, which abstracts from the rich particularity of 
objects, is critical to science. It is “a paradox” that by “turn[ing] our backs on 
the immediate qualities of things,” we can increase our understanding of their 
“relations” to other things. “The possibility of control of the occurrence of 
individual objects is thereby increased. At the same time, the latter gain added 
meaning for the import of the scheme of continuity of relationships with other 
things is incorporated within them.”39 
In science, we test hypotheses by designing interventions and measuring 




their consequences. Science works best within a broad and diverse community, 
but it can be a community only if it has standards for describing interventions 
and assessing consequences. If we want to investigate whether aspirin abates 
fever, we need uniform ways of describing interventions (composition and 
dosage of aspirin) and consequences (change in patient condition). The same 
point applies to experimentalist business enterprises. Lean production pro-
ponents advise, “Continuous improvement methods depend on identifying, 
setting, and improving standards. Standards form the baseline for all improve-
ment methods and they define the breakthrough goals you strive to meet as your 
continuous improvement activities gain momentum.”40 
Standardization increases both the number and the diversity of users and 
developers of a practice or product. Any lamp that you buy in an American 
furniture store will plug into most of the sockets in any American residence. 
This is because both lamp plugs and home sockets are made to a single compati-
bility standard. The resulting market of numerous and diverse consumers 
supports the creation of a vast array of products. With any of the internet search 
engines you find on your personal computer, you access any of the millions of 
sites on the World Wide Web. This is because both engines and sites use the 
program http (hyper-text transfer protocol). People who learned to type on a 
QWERTY keyboard are able to operate the keyboards of thousands of other 
machines that use this format. In each case, a standard that harmonizes one 
dimension of a product or practice facilitates the creation of networks that can 
produce products or practices that vary along many others. By precluding 
variation on some dimensions, standardization facilitates the identification and 
constitution along other dimensions of sub-groups large enough to facilitate 
products tailored to their needs or tastes. Without some standardization, demand 
would be so fragmented that tailored products could not attain feasible scale. 
Standards can be mandatory or voluntary. The plug size in a residence is 
mandated by building codes, but no law requires manufacturers of thermometers 
to use the Fahrenheit scale. Yet the example of the thermometer shows that 
practical pressures behind some voluntary standards can be as powerful as the 
legal ones behind mandatory ones. Once a critical mass of other patients and 
doctors are using the Fahrenheit standard, it becomes prohibitively costly for me 
not to. Using an idiosyncratic scale would mean that the vast literature on 
diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions comparable to mine that uses that 
standard would be of relatively little use to me. Standards can be relatively bene-
ficial or relatively harmful. Relatively poor standards may incorporate inferior 
technology. (The QWERTY keyboard and the Windows operating system are 
both inferior to alternative technologies.) They may not be sufficiently detailed. 
(The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s standards for labeling “organic” food 
have only a single classification, so that a variety of important distinctions 
among products that meet the criteria are ignored.) They may be unnecessarily 
restrictive. (AT&T used to standardize its system so that only equipment made 
by its manufacturing affiliate could connect to its network.) 




Standards can be developed by government agencies, like the Department 
of Agriculture, or by non-governmental organizations, like Underwriters’ 
Laboratories. Governmental agencies sometimes give privately formulated 
standards the force of law by adopting them as or incorporating them into 
regulations. Many cities and states have taken their housing and building codes 
from the standard codes of the International Conference of Building Officials, a 
non-governmental organization. Even when standards remain private, they are 
often backed by strong economic pressures. This creates a potential for abuse. 
Firms and groups have incentives to try to influence standards to their private 
advantage, as AT&T’s practice indicates. Thus, when private standards acquire 
strong economic power, the anti-trust laws are supposed to constrain the ability 
of people to manipulate them for private advantage. The charge that AT&T’s 
standard for interconnecting phone equipment was not socially efficient and was 
designed to give monopoly power to its manufacturing affiliate was an 
important part of the case that led to the break-up of the telephone giant. It’s also 
possible that too many private standards will catch on, fragmenting the market 
in ways that are inefficient. Last time I had to replace the battery for my watch, I 
found 20 different sizes at my local drug store, but not one that fit. 
During the same period that has seen the emergence of Toyota-style 
production practice, standards have proliferated and standard-setting organiza-
tions have multiplied and grown. This trend has reflected and facilitated the 
decentralization and dispersion of economic activity in the increasingly global 
economy. In the electronics industry, for example, the small-company economy 
that has flourished in Silicon Valley and recently spread to places that include 
Taiwan, Israel, and India depends on technical standards. Standards enable small 
companies to design portions of semiconductor chips knowing that they will fit 
into the larger chip, or whole chips knowing they will fit with an array of 
different central processing units. Software designers can write programs in their 
living rooms for PCs, knowing that, if they adhere to PC technical standards, the 
programs will run on any PC. Standardizing the PCs reduces their diversity, but 
it vastly increases the diversity of available applications. Without standardiz-
tion, every type of chip would need specific hardware and software configured 
for it. It would be much harder to disperse tasks among small enterprises and 
much more likely that a smaller number of large companies would internalize 
the making of all the components.41 
We can distinguish two diversity-promoting effects of standardization. 
Standards make local practice more self-conscious and transparent. In doing so, 
they undermine the homogenizing tendency of tacit, unreflective generalization. 
Standards also increase the capacity to coordinate and compare across localities, 
and hence the range of available particularized adaptations. Both effects can be 
seen in a range of standard-based innovations in the public sector. 
Traditional professionalism resists standardization on the ground that it 
rigidifies judgment and limits its capacity to respond to particularity. But 
professions have recognized increasingly that the kind of informal tacit 




judgment traditionally treated as paradigmatic has rigidities of its own. It is 
vulnerable to unconscious and inarticulate stereotypes developed from prior 
experience. These stereotypes can be more dangerous than standards because 
they are less readily subject to critical examination and testing. By forcing 
people to articulate their presuppositions, standardization exposes them to 
interrogation and investigation.  
In medicine, diagnostic protocols dictate interventions in the presence of 
a prescribed set of observations, many of which themselves involve standardized 
measurements like temperature and blood pressure. Standardized protocols have 
been shown to out-perform all-things-considered professional judgment for the 
treatment of cardiac emergencies, and computerized administration of medica-
tion seems to out-perform non-mechanical judgment. Where informal judgment 
remains important, standards are often used to structure decision-making to 
insure that some considerations are not ignored either because of cognitive 
failures or failures of coordination (for example, where each participant mis-
takenly assumes that one of the others is taking care of a critical task).42 
Marie Clay has developed an approach to teaching reading that prescribes 
standardized recording that produces records like this: 
 
 
Figure 2.  
Marie Clay, An Observation Survey of Early Literacy Achievement 62 (2nd edn 
2005) 





She argues for this practice as a corrective to the tendency of informal observa-
tion to reflect unconscious influences. Without standardization, “[y]ou bring to 
the observation what you already believe,” Clay warns.43 
Officials in the juvenile justice systems of some localities, including 
Portland, Oregon, and Santa Cruz, California, found that when they introduced 
standardized “risk assessment instruments” at the expense of traditional informal 
judgment in decisions about arrest, pretrial detention, and sentencing, both the 
aggregate amount of incarceration and its disproportionate incidence on minori-
ties abated. When examined, informal judgments turned out to rest on tacit 
criteria that disadvantaged minorities, such as associating youth from single-
parent families with higher risk. When examined empirically, some of these 
criteria proved to be no better predictors of non-appearance or recidivism than 
less discriminatory ones.44 
When we ask the professionals to articulate their premises so that we can 
turn them into standards, or to compare their intuitive judgments to established 
standards, we are engaging in a pragmatist learning process. We are subjecting 
preconceptions of past experience to the potential “irritations” of new 
experience. The pragmatist treats intuitive judgment and formal standards as 
potentially mutually corrective irritants. Each can be questioned and revised in 
the light of the other in a process of continuous re-assessment.45 The second 
diversity-increasing effect of standardization arises from our enhanced capacity 
to coordinate across localities. A key domain of coordination is investigation 
and learning. Standardization increases the ability to appraise and learn from 
comparisons. Comparisons across localities can enhance political accountability 
within each one. And rich standards applied to a large and diverse population 
increase the likelihood of finding solutions that fit particular needs.  
In Democracy by Disclosure, Mary Graham suggests that recent health 
and safety regulation works to induce a kind of local activism she calls “techno-
populism.”46 An example is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a federal 
system that mandates reporting in terms of a standard metric discharges of 
specified toxic substances. The metric is crude, and there are serious problems 
of design and implementation in the program. Nevertheless, the regime seems to 
have had a substantial effect in reducing discharges. The federal data have been 
widely disseminated by the media. Nongovernmental organizations and state 
and local governments have pushed for improved performance from nearby 
facilities, and industry has undertaken a variety of efforts in response to or in 
anticipation of such pressures, or simply in the interest of good public relations. 
The TRI metrics do not themselves attempt to facilitate comparisons 
along dimensions other than volume of discharges, but other systems are more 
ambitious. In a few states, mortality rates for certain kinds of surgery are re-
ported by hospital (and even by surgeon). After reports that surgeons responded 
by avoiding high-risk patients, the measures were enhanced with an algorithm 
designed to adjust for several factors bearing on the riskiness of the patients. 




Regulators assess the performance of banks under the mandate of the 
Community Reinvestment Act that they lend to low and moderate-income 
residents of their service areas by constructing peer groups of banks in similar 
economic and demographic circumstances and comparing their performances. 
The New York City schools system reports the performances of individual 
schools on several dimensions both on a general scale and in comparison to a 
16-member peer group of schools with student bodies of comparable prior 
achievement levels and demographics.47 
The course of “standards-based” educational reform has been rocky, but 
some of its key initiatives aspire to develop standardization in ways that produce 
individuation both by enhancing the local transparency of practice and 
facilitating the identification of effective tailored strategies across sites. The 
federal No Child Left Behind Act required that states set their own standards of 
educational progress and than measure and report to their citizens on their 
degree of success in attaining them. It prescribed a standardized national test 
(the National Assessment of Education Progress) to facilitate comparison of 
progress across states. Local school performance must be reported to parents on 
“report cards.” The Act had many defects, but some of them have been 
addressed with promising developments. Forty states have agreed to develop a 
set of “common core” educational standards that will provide richer and more 
uniform benchmarks than the state-by-state proficiency thresholds. A con-
sortium of non-governmental organizations has organized a “Data Quality 
Campaign” to generate political pressure and provide tools to improve testing. 
The Obama administration organized a competitive grant program called “Race 
to the Top” to support the improvement of student achievement data and to 
develop accompanying “Instructional Improvement Systems” that connect 
diagnosed achievement deficits with remedial interventions that are both 
standardized and individualized. 
An Instructional Improvement System is illustrated by the diagram from 
the Maryland’s Race to the Top 2010 application, available online at 
www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phase2-applications/maryland.pdf on p. 
123. The system contemplates that the teacher start with a subject defined by the 
multi-state “common core” curricular standards. She then plans and executes a 
lesson tailored to the abilities of her class; tests the efficacy of the lesson; 
follows up with remedial interventions targeted on the weaknesses revealed in 
the assessments, if necessary differentiated for different groups or individuals. 
Then she re-assesses. In doing so, she draws on standardized guidance for the 
lessons, standardized assessments, and remedial instruction standardized to 
particular weaknesses (as portrayed in the “toolkit gateway and portal”). No 
doubt many subjects do not lend themselves to this type of instruction. But for 
those that do, the system potentially captures the individualizing capacities of 
standardization. With rich standards and assessments, diagnosis can identify 
local and individual weaknesses. With a sufficiently extensive repertory of 
remedial interventions, responses can be customized. Of course, no single class 




or school could develop a large repertory. The system depends on the ability to 
identify effective interventions across localities through standards that connect 
the interventions to the diagnoses. 
Dewey’s work on education was focused on the individual classroom or 
school. He did not consider specifically the larger architecture of a democratic 
school system. But Race to the Top seems responsive to his general suggestion 
that we take inspiration from the organizational structure of science in designing 
public programs. 
To say that standards can promote decentralization and diversity is not to 
say that they will do so, or even that they have a general tendency to do so. 
Whether they do so or not depends on the nature of the standards and the 
surrounding institutions. Since standards are public goods, governments may 
have to intervene to subsidize or produce them. Where private groups produce 
them, government will have to monitor both the standards-making process and 
the industry structure that results from standards. Thus, standards have become a 
central preoccupation of antitrust and intellectual property law.48 The challenge 
of a democratic politics of standards is to craft public subsidies, antitrust 
penalties, and intellectual property rights so as to enhance diversity. The key 
point is that such a politics has precisely the superficially paradoxical qualities 
Dewey asserted: it must be carried out through national institutions and 
practices, but if successful, it will promote local autonomy and diversity. 
 
3.3. Team-based Decision-making: Bracketed Consensus 
 
Business practice has also produced suggestive answers to the questions of 
democratic participation: How do we induce the participation that’s needed 
while keeping numbers within manageable bounds? How do we deal with 
opportunism and unreflective conformity? The answer we find in the theory and 
practice of recent business organization might be called bracketed consensus. 
There are really two ideas. The first is that proceedings oriented toward 
consensus can, in some situations, achieve productive learning and coordination. 
The second is that consensus processes can be nested in structures with different 
kinds of institutions in order to limit them to the situations in which they are 
most likely to be effective.49 
Consensus implies deliberation among stakeholders aimed at producing 
general agreement. A stakeholder is anyone affected by the problem under 
consideration. Deliberation means discussion in which people are expected to 
give reasons for their views and be open-minded toward the views of others. 
“Agreement” is a little harder to define. Literally, consensus means unanimity. 
Every participant has to sign on for a decision to emerge. In practice, however, 
people recognize that complete agreement is often impossible to achieve (and 
that even when it is achieved some people may agree only because they feel 
pressured to do so). Moreover, a procedure that gives everyone a veto permits 
hold-outs acting in bad faith to block decisions they know are generally 




beneficial unless they are given some private benefit. So consensus-based 
decision-making treats unanimous agreement as a goal, not an absolute 
requirement. The group hopes for consensus, but it will settle for less if that 
proves impossible. How much less is unspecified, but a decision supported by a 
mere majority would not be viewed as a success. 
Process norms require participation through persuasion rather than 
threats. Deliberators must try to justify their positions in terms of broadly shared 
interests or norms of sufficient generality to be plausibly expected to command 
general assent. The meaning of consensus also depends heavily on the bounds of 
the group within which consensus is sought. Eligibility for participation is 
typically described in inclusive but vague terms. The processes aspire to recruit 
representatives of all affected interests. But convenors or other actors often have 
discretion to screen or limit participation. 
The goal of consensus-based decision-making is to induce people most 
likely to have relevant information and ideas about a problem to provide it and 
to engender commitment to the ultimate decision from the people who will have 
to implement it. Of course, it is more difficult to reach consensus than to make a 
decision by majority-rule. That’s part of the point. With majority rule, once a 
view becomes dominant, there’s no strong pressure to listen to or consider 
others. Thus, there’s a strong risk that views that are initially widely but 
unreflectively shared won’t be fully examined. By contrast, consensus-based 
decision making requires the group to confront the views of everyone who 
speaks. And consensus-based decision-making increases the chances that any 
given participant, even one with unusual views, will have an influence.  
Consider how such a process mitigates the concerns with which we 
began. Pressures toward unreflective conformity are reduced by the fact that the 
participants have individual interests and stakes in the matter that they will be 
motivated to defend. If affected interests are broadly represented, the dispersion 
of interests should impede premature closure. Problems of opportunism or bad 
faith are likely to be more severe, but there are well-known counter-pressures in 
the deliberative setting. As Dewey emphasized, the process of respectful 
engagement seems to have a tendency to induce solidarity. People forced to 
assume the guise of collaborative, public-regarding citizens sometimes come 
unconsciously to identify with their roles. Or they may come to feel trapped by 
their own rhetoric into altruistic measures in order to save face. Perhaps most 
important is the basic Deweyan hope that they will discover new insight about 
themselves (that is, they will reconsider their initial understanding of their 
private interests) or about the practical possibilities of reciprocal gain.50 
This structure also creates at least modest pressures toward both inducing 
and limiting participation appropriately. As opposed to majority rule or a 
dictatorship, a consensus process gives each participant a greater chance of 
influencing the outcome. This greater chance of influence may induce people 
who would not choose to participate in other processes to join a consensus-based 
one. At the same time, the commitment to consensus may cause others not to 




participate. Where decision is by majority vote (and admission is open), people 
may feel inclined to show up just to add the weight of their vote to positions that 
are already well represented. But where decision is by consensus, such people 
may feel that, as long as their views are adequately represented, they do not need 
to show up. The consensus goal thus has some tendency both to induce 
participation by those likely to make important contributions and to reduce it by 
those whose participation would be duplicative.  
At the same time, Dewey inspires hope that the focus of deliberation on 
concrete problems shared by the deliberators will facilitate agreement. Here 
Dewey’s ideas resonate with two prescriptions of recent negotiation theory. The 
first, in language associated with Roger Fisher and William Ury, is “focus on 
interests, not positions.”51 Interests are relatively concrete needs or desires 
divorced from strong presumptions about causes or solutions. “Improving the 
capacities of lagging students” is an interest; “charter schools” is a position. The 
pragmatist idea is that ideological abstractions tend to evolve away from the 
concrete interests that they originally responded to. The remedy to re-focus on 
the concrete and the practical. The second prescription is to treat proposals as 
hypotheses for investigation. To treat a proposal as a hypothesis requires that 
means of testing it be specified and that the tests be built into the reform. 
Specifying tests is a form of intellectual discipline that may lead to productive 
clarity; running the tests facilitates learning.52 
Of course, these points suggest no more than that the disadvantages of 
deliberation might sometimes be neutralized, not that there is any tendency for 
them to be. The most convincing reason for optimism about deliberative 
processes is that there are many examples of its successful operation. Consider 
two in areas we have just touched on – the Toyota production system and 
standard-setting. In Toyota-style manufacturing plants, when a worker pulls the 
andon cord, a problem-solving deliberation ensues. “Anyone with relevant 
knowledge of a problem is included, regardless of rank.”53 The group strives for 
a consensus solution and often achieves one.  
Standard setting processes are similar, though they draw on an array of 
stakeholders that extends across firms, and often, national boundaries. People 
and organizations with an interest in the matter are invited and sometimes 
actively encouraged to participate. They deliberate in person or by exchanges of 
correspondence. A wholly successful deliberation produces consensus, though 
sometimes, the group has to settle for less. An example is the Engineering Issues 
Task Force (EITF), which plays a central role in writing the protocol for 
transmission of information over the internet – hypertext transfer protocol, or 
http. The EITF is responsible for drafting revisions to the standard. The task 
force has virtually no formal membership. Anyone can attend its meetings, and 
anyone who attends is eligible to participate in the working groups that develop 
standard revisions. The groups strive for, and generally achieve, “rough 
consensus” – “something less than full unanimity but something more than a 
majority of those present.”54 The deliberative pressures toward information-




sharing, re-assessment, and solidarity play a role in the success of these 
processes. They are not the whole story, however, and this brings us to a second 
response to the limitations of deliberation – bracketing. Deliberative processes 
are not necessarily free-standing; they may be nested in larger structures that 
may take a different form. At Toyota, for example, problem-solving delibera-
tions take place against a background of more conventional relations in which 
the corporation as employer has broad hierarchical control rights subject to the 
employment and collective bargaining rights of the unionized employees. In the 
internet protocol regime, a standard that emerges from the consensus process 
only becomes effective when it receives the approval of the Internet 
Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Standards Group, more 
exclusive, hierarchical organizations than the IETF. These surrounding 
institutions stand as checks on the capture by private interests or the stalemate of 
the deliberative processes. They can also channel issues to these processes that 
are most likely to be effectively resolved there.55 
Dewey remains a helpful guide on the question of what types of issues 
are best suited for consensual deliberation. It’s common to suggest that delibera-
tion works best with instrumental issues rather than “questions of value.”56 But 
he famously rejected this distinction. Values, he argued, are predictions that the 
world will be satisfying if certain conditions obtain. We inevitably test and 
revise these predictions in the light of experience, and we can and should do so 
more systematically. In Dewey’s view, the key conditions of deliberation are 
uncertainty and interdependence. Uncertainty means that that the solution to the 
problem is not fully known; addressing it must involve investigation. Inter-
dependence means that no subset of the stakeholders can act effectively alone. 
These two conditions entail that no actor or coalition capable of imposing a 
solution is confident what the right solution is, and no one who feels certain 
about a solution is able to impose it without engaging the others. The inter-
dependence condition is not exogenous to institutions. What people can do on 
their own is a function of their legal and social endowments. Encompassing 
institutions can alter these endowments in order to generate productive local 
collaboration. This practice is exemplified by what economists call the “penalty 
default” and some Deweyans have called the “destabilization right.”57 
The penalty-default idea comes from business law, but it has notable 
applications in public policy. For example, the Endangered Species Act provides 
that land development that would impair (“take”) certain listed species cannot 
proceed unless the developer produces a Habitat Conservation Plan acceptable 
to the Secretary of the Interior. A plan acceptable to the Secretary generally 
requires the developer to engage and, ideally, win the agreement of stakeholders, 
including environmental groups. In effect, this scheme changes the applicable 
property rule for covered land from free development to no development. The 
new rule is a default rule because it governs only in the absence of an acceptable 
alternative agreement. But it is not a conventional default rule. A conventional 
default reflects the legislator’s or regulator’s judgment about what the best 




outcome would be in the absence of agreement. But that is not what is going on 
with the Endangered Species Act. Few people think that no development at all is 
likely to be optimal. However, the legislator or regulator could not herself 
specify adequate conservation plans for all affected property. A penalty default 
is designed to induce the better informed or more powerful party – in this case, 
the developer – to engage with others to produce a more satisfactory response.  
A “destabilization right” refers to a more ambitious form of this type of 
intervention. In recent decades, federal courts have proved willing to intervene 
to induce the restructuring of public institutions, such as schools, prisons, 
housing authorities, and child welfare systems, that have chronically failed to 
meet basic obligations. Over time, the mode of intervention has shifted from 
“command and control” efforts in which the court dictates performance in detail 
to experimentalist efforts in which the court induces the defendant institution to 
engage stakeholders, produce a reform plan collaboratively, and open itself to 
transparent monitoring and performance assessment. The court’s intervention 
takes a penalty-default form, since it typically involves a threat of an action that 
no one wants, such as shutting the facility or jailing the administrators but that 
the defendant can escape by productively engaging the stakeholders. 
Bracketing assumes that extensive reform can take place incrementally. It 
thus rejects the suspicion that background inequalities will necessarily determine 
the outcome of deliberation or at least undermine the possibility of mutually 
beneficial progress. The Deweyan intuition is that, as long as the interdepen-
dence condition is satisfied, the uncertainty condition means that progress 
cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, the Deweyan perspective has to concede 
that the brackets will tend to be porous and tentative. Porousness suggests the 
possibility that background inequalities will constrain deliberation. But there is 
also the possibility that productive deliberation will spill back over the bound-
aries initially set for it and affect background social structures. In the Toyota 
Production System, “production” issues have a tendency to spill over into 
“design” issues, as team members decide that the most effective way to solve 
some problem is to change the production specifications.58 And integrators often 
encourage their suppliers to question and improve on the specifications for their 
components.59 Similarly, reform efforts in structural injunction cases often start 
with a narrow focus – say the racial incidence of the process by which pupils are 
assigned to schools – and broaden to such matters as curriculum, facilities, and 




The social and technological changes that drive new organizational practices 
undermine traditional forms of democracy built around the nation-state, the 
public bureaucracy, and tacit professional judgment. They are thus threatening, 
and they undoubtedly have the potential to exacerbate authoritarian, techno-
cratic, and plutocratic tendencies. But Dewey’s political thought suggests they 




also represent opportunity. Dewey articulated criticisms of traditional demo-
cratic institutions before they came under their current pressures. And he called 
for new forms of organization that have some resemblance to forms that are 
currently emerging. His ideas are thus likely to be valuable aids to discerning 
and appraising their democratic potential.  
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